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HOSPITAL CONCESSIONS: FLEXIBILITY IN PRACTICE 
A. Blanken1, G.P.M.R. Dewulf2 and W.D. Bult-Spiering3 
ABSTRACT 
Over the last decade hospitals concessions have been increasingly implemented around the world. 
Nonetheless, concession arrangements are subject to many criticisms, which are to a large extent 
related to the issue of flexibility. Several authors have expressed concerns as to whether concession 
arrangements are able to provide the flexibility these need in order to secure optimal qualitative 
hospital facilities and services in the future. This research is on how flexibility is actually perceived 
in operational hospital concessions. In a case study, an assessment is made on the extent to which 
English and Australian hospital concessions incorporate the ability to respond to changing demand 
patterns for clinical services, i.e. mechanisms that provide the flexibility. The outcomes of the case 
study analysis show that hospital concessions are difficult or expensive to change during their 
operational phase. However, this appears not to be a consequence of implementing the concession 
model in its own, but rather the result of sub-optimally designed contracts and/or procurement 
processes. It is argued that in order to build hospitals that are able to deliver optimal outcomes over 
time, in addition to a financial focus, health providers should stress flexibility by setting flexible 
output specifications. Besides, the contract should incorporate the right incentive structures to make 
both contract partners responsible for flexibility issues that might arise in the future. These 
outcomes can be used by future hospital boards willing to implement a concession arrangement for 
their (partly) new hospital building.  
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CONCESSIONS 
Traditionally, governments in Western countries were responsible for providing a wide and diverse 
range of health infrastructure and its services. Today, many governments are deregulating and 
privatizing public-service delivery in the health care sector. Today, all EU member states are 
launching new programs or at least studying the feasibility of developing Public-Private 
Partnerships as a means to generate more value for money. The United Kingdom has a long 
tradition of PPP, known as the Private Finance Initiative. In other countries similar arrangements 
known as PFI, DBMFO or BO(O)T have been developed. Together these arrangements are 
captured under the term ‘concessions’. 
Concessions are a relatively new means of providing hospitals and can overcome financing and 
other bottlenecks associated with traditional provision. This form of providing health facilities and 
its services is based on a scheme by which the public authority transfers the design, construction, 
operation, and financing of the infrastructure to a private organization (Bult-Spiering and Dewulf, 
2006). Under the PFI, the private organization, the so-called concessionaire, finances the project 
and has full responsibility for operations and maintenance. Another characteristic of PFI is the 
long-term duration of the contract. 
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Hospitals being built under concessions are expected to provide solutions to overcome the 
bottlenecks associated with a more traditional approach to hospital provision. However, despite 
these hospital concessions being increasingly implemented, they are subject to many criticisms, 
which are, for most of the part, related to the issue of flexibility.  
THE NEED FOR FLEXIBILITY 
Concession contracts are signed for periods of more than 15 years and, therefore, it is important to 
analyse the impact on the long-run. Hospitals involve complex, long-term capital investments. 
Once created, hospitals are difficult to change, whether in terms of geography, culture (as they 
often face entrenched professional attitudes), or in their scope (the conditions treated in them) 
(Thompson & McKee, 2004). Despite the complexities surrounding hospital capital investments, 
there is growing recognition of the need for continuing investment. Investments are inevitable due 
to changes in the market and contexts of hospitals. (Thompson and McKee, 2004) 
Demand for health services is very sensitive to variations in the hospital’s catchment population, 
including natural demographic changes and migration pattern change. Not surprisingly, the 
dynamic context of a hospital makes the demand on hospitals difficult to predict, both in terms of 
the quantity and the type of use at the beginning of a hospital’s operation and the demand at the end 
of operation.  
Medical technologies have rapidly advanced over the past 30 years and thus have influenced the 
demand for clinical activities. The developments in medical technology have dramatically 
improved productivity and substantially increased hospital capacity for treating patients and 
providing interventions. Similar progress, possibly at even faster rates, is anticipated in the future. 
Government policy in the health sector can also affect the demand for clinical services. For 
instance, the UK government recently committed itself to increasing the volume of elective work 
undertaken in the independent sector, which may result in a reduction of out-patient activities at 
‘public’ hospitals. IPPR (2001) also enumerates a number of policy changes in the nature of 
healthcare that have an effect on demand. For example, the move towards care closer to home; the 
emphasis on linking professionals and specialists in networks that cut across health institutions and 
provide a pathway of care for patients; and an awareness of the evolving relationship between 
district general hospitals, regional centres, community hospitals and primary care providers. 
As a result, the pattern of hospital activity may change dramatically. The long contract period of a 
concession makes flexibility even more important. Many hospital Trusts are only certain of their 
sources of income on a short-term basis, and cannot anticipate what their demand will be in 20 to 
30 years time (Froud, 2003) due to changes in demographics, medical technology, and government 
policies, which can all be highly volatile. The fact that hospitals need to win short-term contracts to 
ensure demand for their health services and the long-term nature of concessions makes the transfer 
of risk even more hazardous.  
Because of the combination of a high demand risk in hospital concessions due to the characteristics 
of hospital facilities and their dynamic context, and the characteristics of concession arrangements; 
and the negative effects should demand risk materialize, hospital concessions require flexibility.   
Little research has been done on flexibility in PFI arrangements although various authors and 
political leaders have expressed concerns as to whether these are able to provide the flexibility 
these need in order to secure optimal qualitative facilities and services in the future. The King’s 
Fund (an independent foundation working for improved health services in the London area) has 
claimed that PFI is in danger of becoming a white elephant, lacking the flexibility needed to keep 
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up with changing policies and technological progress. Several authors, including Froud (2003); 
Barlow & Köberle-Gaiser (2007), have expressed concerns as to whether concession arrangements 
are able to provide the flexibility these need in order to secure optimal qualitative hospital facilities 
and services in the future. The King’s Fund has also claimed that concessions lacking the flexibility 
needed to keep up with changing policies and technological progress. However, little research has 
been conducted on whether how flexibility is actually perceived in operational hospital 
concessions.  
MEASURING FLEXIBLITY IN HOSPITAL CONCESSIONS 
Flexibility performance of a hospital concession is judged upon whether the arrangement provides 
the ability to respond to changing demand levels for clinical activities, and also to a different 
configuration or desired quality level of these activities. In other words, it is analyzed whether 
concessions have adequate provisions to respond to changing demand levels, and whether the 
provisions in the concession arrangement limit the flexibility of health authorities.  
These provisions are found specifically in operational outcomes. These are about whether 
flexibility has been an essential issue in practice, based on experience in concession projects itself.  
One of the most important aspects that determine the operational outcomes on flexibility is the 
contract used for the project. Concession contracts apparently establish an agreed approach to 
flexibility. The legal contract therefore can be analyzed in order to determine how flexibility is 
allocated between the public and private sector partners in the specific cases. Flexibility-related 
issues are established in the contract specifications between the partners. In the risk allocation 
matrices, established in contracts, it becomes clear who is responsible for dealing with change.  
Another aspect that seems to play a relatively large role in the flexibility outcomes of concession 
arrangements is the way the procurement process is designed. During procurement important 
measures like the capacity of the hospital and awarding criteria are settled. It might be of 
importance to analyse the procurement process accurately in finding causes that explicate the 
operational outcomes of concession projects.  
Summarized, the assessment as to what extent operational concessions embrace the ability to 
accommodate flexibility is based on three levels: (1) the operational outcomes, which involves 
reflecting on how flexible the concession appeared after the hospital became in operation; (2) the 
way the procurement process was designed; and (3) the contract, consisting of the structures of 
exchange that should ensure the accommodation of future contingencies.  
It is not clear to what extent concession arrangements undermine the ability to respond to a 
changing consensus about the configuration or desired level and quality of services in the future. 
This will be analyzed through case study research, which is described in the next section.  
CASE STUDIES 
In this study, the degree to which hospital concessions accommodate flexibility in practice is 
analyzed. In this case study an assessment is made of the extent to which seven English and 
Australian hospital concession projects incorporate the ability to respond to changing demand 
patterns for clinical services, i.e. mechanisms that provide the flexibility. The overall flexibility of 
several hospital concessions is analyzed within their contexts and assessed on different levels: (1) 
the operational outcomes, which involves reflecting on how flexible the concession appeared after 
the hospital became in operation; (2) the way the procurement process was designed; and (3) the 
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contract, consisting of the structures of exchange that should ensure the accommodation of future 
contingencies.  
In the case study research, flexibility was analyzed on a project-by-project basis. The assumption is 
that each project will have a different provision regarding flexibility issues which needs to be 
thoroughly analyzed and understood. It is also important to recognize that the appropriate 
distribution of demand risk is dependent on the resources and the capabilities of the parties to a 
contract, and that this can vary considerably. Given the above problems, and the underlying 
structure of concessions, flexibility is analyzed in several case studies. The overall objective of the 
case study research is to assess the process and the rationale underpinning the distribution of 
flexibility as it is related to demand risk. Cases will be judged upon their ability to adapt to 
changing clinical demand since flexibility depends on an uncertain context.  
OPERATIONAL OUTCOMES 
England: The employment of design flexibility appears to be performed by incumbent construction 
companies, which raises doubts about the effectiveness of benchmarking exercises. Design 
variations are mostly implemented using contract amendments rather than temporally rearranging 
the use of spaces (both countries).  
Both English and Victorian cases show that tactical service flexibility is hardly incorporated in 
hospital concessions. As a result the private partner could become indifferent to optimally using the 
hospital reasoned from the clinical processes provided.  
From the projects it appears that design flexibility is constrained by the small capacity initially set 
for the hospitals. The comparison of the cases reveals that the scale in the first wave of hospital 
concessions was set assuming conservative future clinical demand levels. In the Darent Valley and 
the Norfolk & Norwich PFI projects, the hospital designs were developed based on a minimum 
projection of the demand level for clinical services. In the Norfolk & Norwich Hospital, the design 
capacity already appeared insufficient when the facility opened. In the early operational phase, it 
had to move some of its administration and management offices outside the hospital facility to 
make room for the much-needed clinical services provision. 
Overcrowded hospitals are favoured due to a maximized used availability charge, but also have 
negative impacts. Overcrowded hospitals can breed infectious viruses such as MRSA and the 
Norovirus (NHS Estates, 2005). In the Norwich and Norfolk University Hospital, which is mostly 
operating above set capacity levels, several outbreaks of viruses have taken place over recent years. 
An overcrowded hospital can also lead to additional costs since availability fees may raise sharply 
when the hospital is operated above set demand levels. Hence, the rush to certainty by setting 
capacity levels low in order to obtain an optimally-employed hospital facility appears futile as 
overcrowding brings forward new risks.   
It further appears that hardly any emphasis is placed on mechanisms that allow an adequate 
temporally change in the hospital design. The absence of provisions to temporally change the 
employment of the facility implies that the ability to adapt the design of the hospital is limited.  
Where there had been a design variation this has mainly been due to changes initiated by the Trust 
rather than the private partner. Private partners are not incentivized to initiate design variations as 
they do not face any rewards for these. It further appears that there is a potential mutual 
dependency between design and service flexibility and financial flexibility. Design and service 
variations mostly result in a price increase for the Trust. Most of the variations were due to new 
factors affecting the Trust’s needs, which arose after the contract was awarded.  
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THE CONTRACT 
In Victoria, the budget for the refurbishment of the facilities is, unlike in English concessions, set 
for the duration of the concession arrangement. Contracts incorporate limited provisions that allow 
for a temporal reduction of the capacity at favourable conditions. Further, the contracts of the seven 
analysed concessions contain hardly any incentives for optimizations for the private partner. The 
costs of implementing design variations must be met by health authorities only, with no obligation 
for private partners for contributions in this respect.  
The contracts further show us that they contain provisions to periodically market-test ancillary 
services are present, both in the UK as well as in Australia. Most hospital concessions allow for 
market-testing every five years, but other intervals are also found.  However, it appears the 
availability part of the unitary charge is predetermined, and is not influenced by variations in the 
demand for clinical services. 
THE PROCUREMENT PROCESS 
In England, decision-making of scope and scale are dominated by financial considerations. In 
Victoria, decision-making is made more on potential values based on an ad-hoc basis.  
CONCLUSIONS 
Due to (1) the characteristics of hospital facilities, (2) their dynamic context and the negative 
effects of inflexible hospital buildings, hospital concessions require flexibility. The outcomes of the 
case study analysis show that hospital concessions are difficult or expensive to change during their 
operational phase. However, this appears not to be a consequence of implementing the concession 
model in its own, but rather the result of sub-optimally designed contracts and/or procurement 
processes. It is argued that in order to build hospitals that are able to deliver optimal outcomes over 
time, in addition to a financial focus health providers should stress flexibility by setting flexible 
output specifications. Besides, the contract should incorporate the right incentive structures to make 
both contract partners responsible for flexibility issues that might arise in the future. 
Health authorities must be convinced of the consequences a PFI arrangement might deliver, as 
implementation implies restrictions to design, service and financial flexibility. In a case study the 
demand-risk-related VFM was assessed. This incorporated an assessment of the extent to which 
hospital concession arrangements incorporate an ability to respond to changing demand patterns for 
clinical services, i.e. mechanisms that provide the flexibility to deliver Value for Money. 
The PFI design should attempt to be an optimal fit with the health authority’s clinical requirements 
and continue to deliver an optimal outcome over time. 
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